The argument of equal ownership
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The argument of equal ownership:

  1. The ComCom structuring adds new type of ownership to the dynamic of the business:
    • The equal ownership, equal between all its c-holders
      • and hence, due its structuring alone, it contributes to bettering the distribution of wealth, ownership and decision-making:
  2. About the value held by any c-holder in the event of exit:
    • Unlike in communism, citizenship or other cooperation-like, The equal ownership is a type of equality, which does not fail in the test of ownership over property1, which is this:
      • Always having the potential (of the act) to exit from it together with the return from the investment put in it, as such return is the owned share in its exchange for some value resulted from a specific transaction with other (3rd) entity!
        • Hence, the case in equal ownership, is never such of being not free to exit with the value of the shared property unlike the one in any case of cooperative, since
          • always it is not allowed to exit (or cut-out) with the value of the shared property in a collective and since accepting this restriction is a prior condition for getting into such collective, and
          • always such restriction alone is exactly the one constituting the option for few to control all the collective (to take it over) and doing that by claiming to represent/protect/assist the most in that collective, but only as long as such "most" could never simply exit with their (equally) shared value,
          • this is valid in any scale of such cooperatives, but in our globalisation the scale is of 1 per Million, i.e. some hundreds or thousands per 6 Billions please for a moment think for your children when you look now for what this could mean.
        • In other words: If you want less corruption corrupting your representative managing your property in a collective, let them know that, until now at any moment you could but did not, and at any farther moment you still can, exit with the property clamed be yours. (please see here more about trust in equality in ownership).
    • Conclusion: The ComCom structuring adds for the individual owner and decision-maker an equality in ownership and decision-making over property of which value is bigger than zero, unlike the known versions of cooperation offering equality in decision-making but in ownership over property of which value is actually zero, if or when the one is not any more bind with the collective (when the one sells her/his shares).
  3. About being collectively validating the value in entrance of new c-holder:
    • The ComCom structuring is evaluated considering its share's price by the market forces only (see more in this Practical calculation), but it also introduce a new authority for diluting, applied with each entry of new c-holder and determined only by (all, or the majority of all) the current c-holders, an additional authority to the normal one of the whole ComCom applied with introducing more issued shares.
    • This new authority and power is applied always and regardless any specific value of the $d$ or $c$ in any ComCom and as a power for diluting it introduce a new check and balance (even with contradicting interests but constantly re-evaluated and resulted) into the business (value and decision-making), especially as, from the respective of the business, the c-holders has some functionality in common.
    • The new check-and-balance then is constantly re-validating the value of the share of the ComCom in the open market.
  4. About the new check-and-balance as it is corresponding to the $d$, being the (static) decentralisation property of each ComCom:
    • $t=i*s=(c*n*s)/d$, where $t$ is the projected value of the ComCom considering the value of all its shares, hence
      • if $s*n$ is unchanged in the event of entry of $a$ new c-holders, as $S=s*(c+a)/c$ and $S$ is the new share's price increased from the old share's price $s$,
      • then all the p-holders together would earn exactly $s*i*(1-d)*(a/c))$ more and just from such event, but such event can only be after at least majority of all current c-holders is approving each entry of any new c-holder to that ComCom.
    • And so the $d$ of each ComCom should be carefully examined by any one interfacing with the ComCom.
    • In general we can say that, the more the c-holders are expected to perform tasks with higher risk for their return and/or be more volunteering, the bigger $d$ should be considered and yes as bigger is the $d$ the better is the distribution of wealth, decision making and ownership in that ComCom.2


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By iswithiswith, on 09 Jul 2012 00:39 history Tags:


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